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  ECONOMIES	  OF	  VIOLENCE	  	  Institute	  for	  the	  Arts	  and	  Humanities	  Pennsylvania	  State	  University	  Distinguished	  Visiting	  Professor	  Lecture	  April	  7,	  2015	  	  John	  Protevi	  Phyllis	  M	  Taylor	  Professor	  of	  French	  Studies	  Professor	  of	  Philosophy	  Louisiana	  State	  University	  	  	  I	  am	  deeply	  honored	  to	  speak	  before	  so	  many	  friends	  and	  colleagues	  at	  the	  university	  that	  has	  played	  such	  a	  great	  role	  in	  my	  life.	  My	  thanks	  go	  to	  the	  Institute	  for	  the	  Arts	  and	  Humanities	  and	  its	  director	  Michael	  Bérubé,	  to	  the	  departments	  co-­‐sponsoring	  the	  visit,	  and	  to	  Jeffrey	  Nealon,	  who	  put	  in	  many	  hours	  proposing	  and	  then	  organizing	  the	  visit.	  	  	  I'd	  like	  to	  speak	  today	  about	  "Economies	  of	  Violence."	  In	  A	  Thousand	  Plateaus	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  write	  of	  the	  differences	  among	  imperial	  States,	  juridical	  States,	  and	  what	  they	  melodramatically	  call	  "war	  machines":	  "Violence	  is	  found	  everywhere,	  but	  under	  different	  regimes	  and	  economies"	  (Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  1980:	  529;	  1987:	  425).	  	  	  A	  regime	  or	  economy	  of	  violence	  would	  be	  the	  pattern	  of	  approved	  and	  disapproved	  violent	  
and	  peaceful	  (violence-­‐avoiding,	  conflict-­‐resolving	  and	  mitigating)	  acts	  and	  responses	  characteristic	  of	  a	  particular	  social	  system.	  I'll	  exclude	  what	  Johanna	  Oksala	  (2012)	  calls	  "ontological	  violence"	  (that	  which	  chops	  up	  the	  world,	  taking	  this	  as	  that,	  the	  very	  form	  of	  discursive	  thought)	  and	  "instrumental	  violence"	  (the	  application	  of	  force	  after	  a	  political	  decision-­‐making	  process,	  e.g.,	  going	  to	  war	  after	  a	  debate).	  Economies	  of	  violence,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  just	  are	  an	  aspect	  of	  social	  systems,	  intertwined	  with	  political	  (decision-­‐making),	  cultural	  (sense-­‐making),	  and	  productive	  /	  distributive	  ("economic")	  patterns.	  	  I	  want	  to	  shift	  the	  focus	  away	  from	  the	  preoccupation	  of	  political	  philosophy	  and	  political	  theory	  –	  the	  constituted	  state	  and	  its	  others	  (domestic	  criminals,	  foreign	  enemies,	  marginal	  terrorists)	  –	  to	  look	  the	  economy	  of	  violence	  inherent	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  "statification"	  –	  the	  ongoing	  process	  of	  producing	  the	  state	  form	  of	  social	  relations	  as	  it	  intersects	  various	  non-­‐state	  socialization	  practices.	  ("Statification"	  is	  the	  ugly	  translation	  of	  étatisation,	  but	  at	  least	  it's	  better	  than	  "statizing").	  	  	  So	  in	  a	  formula,	  I	  want	  to	  broaden	  political	  philosophy	  /	  theory	  to	  include	  concerns	  often	  confined	  to	  anthropology.	  I	  will	  follow	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  and	  some	  of	  their	  anthropological	  sources	  on	  "societies	  against	  the	  state,"	  Pierre	  Clastres	  (1974	  /	  1989;	  1980	  /	  1994;	  see	  also	  Abélès	  2014)	  and	  Marshall	  Sahlins,	  Stone	  Age	  Economics	  (1972),	  and	  a	  very	  good	  recent	  book	  by	  Guillaume	  Sibertin-­‐Blanc,	  Politique	  et	  État	  chez	  Deleuze	  et	  Guattari	  (2013).	  In	  addition,	  James	  Scott's	  The	  Art	  of	  Not	  Being	  Governed	  (2009)	  will	  be	  in	  the	  background	  here,	  as	  will	  Christopher	  Boehm's	  Moral	  Origins	  (2012).	  	  Now	  wait	  a	  minute,	  comes	  the	  objection,	  who	  says	  political	  philosophy	  /	  theory	  ignores	  statification?	  Doesn't	  social	  contract	  theory	  concern	  statification?	  Yes,	  but	  in	  the	  mode	  of	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  justification.	  I	  want	  here	  to	  look	  at	  empirical	  processes	  of	  statification.	  Asking	  in	  the	  mode	  of	  justification	  if	  there	  is	  "more"	  or	  "less	  "violence	  in	  any	  one	  State	  or	  non-­‐State	  social	  form	  begs	  the	  question	  of	  the	  homogeneity	  of	  "violence"	  across	  social	  forms	  allowing	  its	  quantitative	  calculation.	  Studying	  economies	  of	  violence	  requires	  a	  qualitative	  study	  of	  the	  social	  form	  in	  which	  it	  is	  embedded:	  what	  is	  the	  form	  of	  life	  that	  the	  economy	  of	  violence	  is	  producing	  and	  reinforcing?	  	  	  It's	  precisely	  the	  fact	  that	  social	  forms	  are	  wider	  than	  the	  state	  that	  compels	  us	  to	  study	  the	  economy	  of	  violence	  of	  statification	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  struggle	  in	  a	  field	  of	  socialization.	  Statification	  as	  a	  process	  has	  an	  economy	  of	  violence,	  a	  meta-­‐economy	  if	  you	  will,	  distinct	  from	  the	  economies	  of	  violence	  of	  constituted	  State	  and	  "primitive"	  societies.	  	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  we	  will	  distinguish	  	  "secondary	  violence"	  (police	  and	  courts	  within	  a	  state)	  from	  "primary	  violence"	  (statification)	  (Sibertin-­‐Blanc	  2013:	  60-­‐63).	  Now	  "primary"	  here	  has	  two	  senses,	  a	  virtual	  or	  topological	  sense	  and	  an	  actual	  or	  chronological	  sense.	  Virtually,	  the	  violence	  of	  statification	  is	  prior	  to	  the	  violence	  of	  constituted	  States.	  Actually	  or	  chronologically,	  there	  was	  a	  first	  statification	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  "Neolithic	  Revolution,"	  the	  enslavement	  of	  non-­‐State	  peoples	  by	  imperial	  state	  conquest,	  turning	  foragers,	  hunters,	  or	  horticulturalists	  into	  peasants.	  (Here	  I'm	  following	  the	  hardcore	  thesis	  of	  Clastres,	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  and	  Scott,	  denying	  any	  gradualism	  or	  willing	  transformation,	  any	  peaceful	  transition	  from	  non-­‐State	  to	  State	  through	  a	  developmental	  process.	  The	  agonies	  of	  the	  agricultural	  peasantry	  are	  such	  as	  to	  require	  force:	  the	  proof	  of	  the	  necessity	  of	  external	  force	  lies	  in	  the	  avoidance	  of,	  and	  flight	  from,	  States	  by	  non-­‐State	  peoples.)	  The	  imbrication	  of	  both	  virtual	  and	  actual	  senses	  of	  the	  "primary	  violence	  of	  statification"	  is	  what	  makes	  so	  challenging	  reading	  Nietzsche	  in	  the	  Genealogy	  (1967)	  and	  following	  the	  grappling	  with	  
Gewalt	  by	  Kant	  (1965;	  discussion	  in	  Protevi	  2001,	  Ch	  7,	  and	  Lesch	  2014),	  by	  Benjamin	  (1986;	  see	  also	  Lesch	  2014),	  and	  by	  Derrida	  (1990).	  	  	  Now	  talking	  about	  the	  "primary	  violence"	  of	  the	  statification	  process	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  foragers	  were	  peaceful	  and	  had	  violence	  thrust	  upon	  them	  by	  the	  state.	  Nor,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  does	  it	  imply	  that	  "primitive"	  non-­‐State	  societies	  are	  a	  "war	  of	  all	  against	  all,"	  and	  that	  statification	  is	  on	  the	  whole	  a	  pacification,	  a	  quantitative	  reduction	  in	  violence.	  All	  societies	  have	  an	  economy	  of	  violence	  (which	  includes	  conflict-­‐avoidance,	  mitigation,	  and	  resolution	  practices);	  it's	  just	  that,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  not	  all	  economies	  of	  violence	  aim	  at	  territorial	  enhancement	  and	  enslavement;	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  not	  all	  violence	  is	  State	  war.	  	  Technically	  speaking,	  for	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  all	  social	  forms	  are	  more	  or	  less	  tenuous	  patterns	  of	  processes	  tending	  toward	  different	  social	  forms.	  So	  you	  can	  have	  a	  concrete	  social	  assemblage	  in	  which	  the	  statification	  process	  more	  or	  less	  dominates	  other	  practices	  tending	  toward	  the	  "primitive"	  non-­‐State	  via	  flight,	  rebellion,	  and	  so	  on.	  It's	  even	  more	  complex	  than	  that	  as	  there	  are	  other	  socialization	  processes	  than	  statification	  and	  primitivization,	  but	  let's	  focus	  on	  them	  in	  this	  talk.	  	  	  In	  the	  talk,	  I'll	  take	  the	  core	  of	  violence	  as	  intentional	  bodily	  harm	  on	  a	  non-­‐consenting	  other,	  but	  that	  leaves	  us	  with	  two	  border	  cases:	  "torturous"	  initiation	  rites	  (to	  which	  initiates	  consent),	  and	  shunning,	  ostracism,	  and	  exile	  (non-­‐bodily,	  but	  forms	  of	  "social	  violence.")	  These	  forms	  need	  to	  be	  included	  to	  discuss	  the	  anti-­‐state	  and	  anti-­‐war	  economy	  of	  violence	  of	  non-­‐State	  socialization	  practices.	  Topologically,	  in	  ongoing	  episodes	  of	  statification	  and	  "primitive	  accumulation,"	  and	  chronologically,	  in	  terms	  of	  nomadic	  forager	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  bands	  as	  they	  serve	  to	  resist	  the	  institution	  of	  the	  first	  imperial	  States	  of	  the	  Neolithic	  Revolution,	  with	  their	  large-­‐scale	  agriculture	  by	  a	  peasant	  or	  slave	  class.	  	  	  What	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  bring	  to	  the	  table	  is	  a	  wide-­‐ranging	  materialist	  ontology,	  so	  that	  we	  can	  use	  the	  same	  basic	  concepts	  of	  self-­‐organizing	  systems	  in	  both	  natural	  and	  social	  registers	  (Protevi	  2009,	  2013).	  So	  we	  have	  to	  be	  interdisciplinary:	  anthropology,	  political	  philosophy,	  developmental	  systems	  theory	  biology,	  and	  child	  development	  psychology.	  The	  ontology	  here	  is	  DeLandean	  /	  Deleuzean:	  we	  deal	  with	  multiplicities	  qua	  dynamic	  interacting	  processes	  in	  multiple	  temporal	  bio-­‐social	  and	  somatic	  registers	  with	  critical	  takeoff	  points.	  1)	  Temporal:	  evolutionary,	  ontogenetic,	  and	  inter-­‐generational.	  2)	  Bio-­‐social:	  group	  dynamics,	  family	  dynamics,	  and	  individual	  /	  caretaker	  dynamics.	  3)	  Somatic:	  neural-­‐endocrinological	  patterning.	  Now	  there	  are	  loops	  here	  through	  DST	  (Developmental	  Systems	  Theory)	  and	  epigenetics:	  the	  patterning	  we	  talk	  about	  is	  not	  so	  much	  (though	  it	  doesn't	  exclude)	  genetic	  changes	  as	  DNA	  sequences	  as	  it	  is	  gene	  expression	  pathways.	  	  	  This	  framework	  enables	  me	  to	  couple	  the	  “politic”	  to	  the	  “body,”	  to	  connect	  the	  social	  and	  the	  somatic.	  Basically,	  Deleuze	  lets	  us	  go	  “above,"	  “below,”	  and	  "alongside"	  the	  subject.	  That	  is,	  “above”	  to	  geo-­‐eco-­‐politics,	  “below”	  to	  bio-­‐culture,	  and	  alongside	  to	  social-­‐techno	  assemblages.	  We	  live	  at	  the	  crossroads:	  singular	  subjects	  arise	  from	  a	  “crystallization”	  or	  “resolution”	  of	  a	  distributed	  network	  of	  natural	  processes	  and	  social	  practices.	  This	  is	  "posthuman	  turn"	  if	  you	  will,	  but	  it's	  posthuman	  in	  wanting	  to	  see	  humans	  as	  bio-­‐cultural,	  distributed,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  So,	  the	  forecast	  of	  the	  paper:	  after	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  anthropological	  consensus	  (more	  or	  less!	  –	  if	  you	  think	  philosophers	  are	  contentious,	  you	  should	  read	  some	  anthropology!)	  of	  social	  forms,	  we	  can	  theorize	  the	  resistance	  to	  statification	  by	  analyzing	  the	  economy	  of	  violence	  of	  non-­‐state	  practices.	  As	  we	  will	  see,	  those	  non-­‐state	  economies	  of	  violence	  are	  not	  necessarily	  that	  of	  war,	  as	  Clastres	  supposes.	  Thus,	  as	  Boehm	  shows,	  not	  all	  anti-­‐state	  violence	  is	  physical	  (there	  is	  also	  ostracism	  and	  exile),	  nor	  is	  it	  organized	  as	  war	  (vendetta	  is	  an	  anti-­‐war	  practice).	  I'll	  conclude	  by	  posing	  the	  "Spinoza	  question"	  –	  how	  does	  statification	  induce	  prosocial	  allegiance	  to	  its	  patterns	  (its	  form	  of	  desiring	  production)?	  –	  and	  by	  a	  few	  remarks	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  human	  nature	  lurking	  at	  the	  margins	  here.	  	   SOCIAL	  FORMS	  	  Following	  Clastres	  and	  Scott,	  I	  will	  mostly	  talk	  about	  non-­‐state	  vs	  State	  socialization	  processes.	  These	  are	  not	  teleological	  stages;	  States	  are	  not	  the	  "mature"	  form	  of	  social	  life;	  there	  may	  have	  been	  chronological	  succession	  when	  the	  first	  State	  fell	  upon	  the	  foragers	  and	  horticulturalists,	  but	  for	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  this	  is	  just	  the	  historical	  instantiation	  of	  virtual	  social	  processes	  which	  form	  a	  non-­‐chronological	  or	  topological	  field	  but	  which	  are	  actualized	  when	  processes	  hit	  thresholds;	  contemporary	  non-­‐state	  peoples	  are	  not	  "living	  fossils";	  non-­‐state	  socialization	  processes	  are	  in	  fact	  positive	  mechanisms	  for	  preventing	  state	  formation.	  	  	  
NON-­‐STATE	  SOCIETIES.	  Nomadic	  forager	  bands	  and	  sedentary	  horticulturalists.	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari's	  terminology	  is	  confusing:	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  use	  the	  term	  "savage"	  or	  "primitive"	  for	  both	  nomadic	  forager	  bands	  and	  for	  sedentary	  horticulturists.	  They	  also	  use	  "nomad"	  for	  the	  Steppe	  nomads,	  who	  are	  anti-­‐State	  more	  than	  "pre-­‐State"	  as	  are	  the	  nomadic	  forager	  bands.	  I'll	  maintain	  their	  use	  of	  the	  term	  "primitive"	  though	  of	  course	  the	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  concept	  of	  "non-­‐state	  society"	  is	  more	  acceptable,	  as	  it	  eliminates	  the	  lingering	  evolutionism	  of	  the	  term	  "primitive."	  	  
Nomadic	  forager	  bands.	  If	  we	  use	  linear	  dating	  the	  nomadic	  forager	  band	  is	  "pre-­‐state"	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  the	  social	  form	  for	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  human	  life,	  prior	  to	  the	  Neolithic	  Revolution	  which	  brought	  states,	  urbanism,	  and	  agriculture.	  Nomadic	  forager	  bands	  are	  egalitarian	  /	  acephalic.	  There	  may	  be	  a	  gendered	  division	  of	  labor,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  specialization	  within	  genders.	  There	  is	  a	  prestige	  gradient	  relative	  to	  prowess,	  but	  group	  discussion	  is	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process;	  there	  is	  rhetoric	  and	  persuasion,	  but	  no	  top-­‐down	  command.	  	  	  
Sedentary	  horticulturalists	  have	  chiefs;	  they	  do	  not	  command,	  though	  they	  do	  have	  perks	  and	  must	  show	  their	  prowess	  in	  warfare.	  These	  are	  discussed	  by	  Pierre	  Clastres	  in	  Society	  
against	  the	  State	  and	  Archeology	  of	  Violence.	  	  Think	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  society	  described	  by	  Montaigne	  in	  "Of	  Cannibals."	  	  	  Clastres's	  discussion	  in	  "Society	  Against	  the	  State,"	  of	  "subsistence	  economy"	  and	  "imperial	  State	  slavery"	  is	  important	  and	  deserves	  some	  time	  here.	  	  	   Euro-­‐prejudice:	  subsistence	  =	  constant	  scramble	  at	  eDeleuze	  and	  Guattarie	  of	  starvation	  /	  dissolution	  /	  war	  with	  others.	  Society	  does	  all	  it	  can	  just	  to	  let	  its	  members	  get	  a	  minimum	  survival.	  YET,	  we	  also	  see	  in	  first-­‐contact	  narratives	  complaints	  about	  the	  "laziness"	  of	  natives:	  they	  do	  what	  they	  need	  and	  then	  lounge	  about.	  So	  it's	  an	  odd	  kind	  of	  "subsistence"	  if	  natives	  were	  healthy	  (they	  weren't	  on	  edge	  of	  starvation)	  and	  had	  plenty	  of	  leisure	  (they	  weren't	  always	  scrounging	  for	  scraps).	  	  	  So	  primitives	  have	  all	  the	  time	  they	  would	  need	  to	  develop	  surplus	  if	  they	  so	  desired.	  They	  refuse	  to	  produce	  useless	  excess:	  they	  produce	  for	  their	  needs.	  In	  fact,	  they	  do	  produce	  a	  surplus:	  that	  is	  then	  consumed	  in	  festivals	  when	  outsiders	  arrive	  and	  /	  or	  neighbors	  are	  invited.	  So	  primitives	  refuse	  "work";	  they	  have	  leisure	  and	  affluence	  (Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  cite	  Sahlins,	  Stone	  Age	  Economics).	  	  Here	  we	  can	  see	  initiation	  rites	  (Anti-­‐Oedipus	  Chapter	  3)	  as	  part	  of	  the	  anti-­‐state	  mechanisms	  preserving	  the	  political	  positivity	  of	  "primitives":	  you	  are	  obligated	  to	  distribute	  production	  in	  a	  way	  that	  prevents	  personal	  property	  /	  hoarding,	  and	  requires	  "dépense."	  	  	  I	  mentioned	  the	  odd	  position	  of	  initiation	  rites	  in	  an	  "economy	  of	  violence."	  Even	  though	  they	  can	  be	  "torturous",	  they	  are	  "voluntary,"	  or	  better,	  key	  elements	  in	  social	  desiring-­‐production.	  You	  are	  constituted	  by	  your	  desire	  to	  distribute	  to	  others	  and	  consume	  what	  they	  give	  you.	  	  So	  for	  Clastres:	  initiation	  rites	  inscribe	  the	  "Anti-­‐One"	  group	  law;	  they	  are	  hence	  anti-­‐state	  mechanism	  –	  as	  is,	  for	  him,	  war.	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  see	  them	  as	  anti-­‐exchange	  or	  anti-­‐"economy"	  practices	  ("economy"	  for	  them	  presupposes	  State	  homogenization	  and	  comparison	  of	  land,	  labor,	  money.)	  Initiation	  rites	  produce	  "mobile	  blocs	  of	  debt"	  (should	  be	  "obligation"),	  and	  hence	  are	  anti-­‐state.	  Initiation	  ensures	  saturation	  of	  social	  field	  with	  always-­‐unequal	  relations	  and	  "anti-­‐production"	  that	  prevents	  stock.	  (Again,	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  cite	  Sahlins	  and	  immediate	  consumption	  in	  AO.)	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  Now	  this	  must	  be	  distinguished	  from	  Nietzsche's	  claims	  about	  the	  torture	  of	  "debtors"	  in	  Essay	  2	  of	  the	  Genealogy	  (1967).	  Nietzsche	  is	  criticized	  by	  David	  Graeber	  in	  Debt	  (2011)	  as	  projecting	  atomized	  individualism	  backwards,	  as	  the	  first	  personal	  relation,	  prior	  to	  any	  organized	  society,	  as	  opposed	  to	  merely	  being	  what	  happens	  in	  state	  society.	  Obligations	  in	  non-­‐state	  society	  are	  not	  oriented	  to	  restoration	  of	  pre-­‐contract	  individuality	  as	  are	  "debts."	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  	  	  
STATE	  SOCIETIES	  are	  the	  last	  social	  form	  we	  want	  to	  discuss	  here.	  Can't	  be	  too	  rigorous;	  I'll	  rely	  on	  an	  everyday	  notion	  of	  specialized	  labor	  and	  hierarchical	  relation;	  command	  is	  the	  major	  form	  of	  decision-­‐making.	  In	  particular	  there	  is	  a	  distinction	  between	  agricultural	  producers	  and	  military	  specialists	  in	  early	  imperial	  States.	  	  	  So	  the	  real	  question	  for	  Clastres,	  and	  for	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  is	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  State,	  the	  State-­‐event,	  or	  statification	  as	  that	  which	  destroys	  SWS.	  It's	  impossible	  to	  conceive	  an	  internal	  mutation	  of	  the	  economy	  leading	  the	  way;	  primitives	  would	  have	  to	  desire	  to	  change,	  but	  their	  whole	  way	  of	  life	  produces	  a	  different	  form	  of	  desire	  (Deleuze	  and	  Guattari's	  desiring-­‐production	  visible	  here).	  For	  Clastres	  and	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  "economics"	  as	  production	  /	  distribution	  is	  not	  autonomous	  from	  social	  relations	  in	  primitive	  society.	  You	  don't	  have	  a	  job	  that	  is	  independent	  of	  your	  family	  relation:	  what	  you	  produce	  and	  how	  you	  distribute	  /	  consume	  is	  determined	  by	  your	  family	  relations,	  and	  that	  is	  your	  desire.	  (Remember	  that	  "desire"	  for	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  is	  not	  about	  lack	  but	  about	  flows	  and	  breaks:	  you	  desire	  that	  flows	  be	  produced	  and	  channeled	  in	  a	  particular	  pattern.)	  	  	  So	  statification	  must	  be	  an	  external	  political	  force	  that	  imposes	  economic	  transformation.	  Statification	  creates	  exploitation;	  it	  doesn't	  merely	  enforce	  it.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  we	  can't	  see	  State	  as	  mere	  instrument	  of	  pre-­‐existing	  ruling	  /	  owning	  class.	  If	  there	  were	  a	  prior	  difference	  in	  force	  allowing	  an	  exploitative	  class,	  why	  bother	  constructing	  a	  State	  to	  wield	  force	  that	  already	  exists?	  	  Similarly,	  if	  the	  State	  protects	  pre-­‐existing	  private	  property,	  how	  does	  that	  arise	  in	  primitive	  society	  dedicated	  to	  refusing	  private	  property?	  (Contra	  Rousseau's	  fable	  beginning	  Part	  2	  of	  the	  Discourse	  on	  Inequality	  [1997],	  no	  one	  was	  fooled	  by	  the	  first	  claim	  to	  private	  property!)	  The	  primitives	  know	  that	  private	  property	  introduces	  inequality,	  because	  the	  entirety	  of	  their	  social	  machine	  is	  dedicated	  to	  producing	  and	  reinforcing	  material	  equality	  (pass	  around	  produced	  goods,	  consume	  excesses)	  and	  the	  desire	  for	  equality:	  (prosocial	  affective	  investment:	  you	  feel	  good	  when	  you	  produce	  and	  consume	  in	  a	  network).	  	  	  Again,	  what	  is	  the	  mystery	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  State?	  In	  fact	  Clastres	  can't	  determine	  the	  conditions	  for	  emergence	  of	  State;	  he	  can	  only	  state	  the	  conditions	  of	  its	  non-­‐emergence	  (Sibertin-­‐Blanc	  2013).	  	  This	  is	  where	  Sibertin-­‐Blanc	  lets	  us	  see	  what	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  are	  doing	  with	  their	  notion	  of	  the	  Urstaat,	  the	  "Ur-­‐State"	  and	  the	  "auto-­‐presupposition"	  of	  the	  State:	  it	  needs	  a	  surplus	  to	  feed	  its	  specialists	  but	  it	  needs	  specialists	  to	  produce	  and	  other	  specialists	  to	  monitor	  and	  confiscate	  that	  very	  surplus.	  This	  is	  a	  rewriting	  of	  Wittfogel	  (1957),	  who	  himself	  rewrites	  the	  Marxist	  “Asiatic	  mode	  of	  production.”	  The	  State	  is	  not	  the	  instrument	  of	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  a	  pre-­‐existing	  dominant	  class:	  it	  is	  itself	  the	  direct	  organization	  of	  society	  enabling	  surplus	  production	  which	  it	  then	  immediately	  appropriates;	  it	  is	  therefore	  itself	  what	  produces	  the	  dominant	  and	  subordinate	  classes.	  It	  is	  to	  address	  this	  problem	  of	  auto-­‐presupposition	  that	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  have	  recourse	  in	  Anti-­‐Oedipus	  to	  Nietzsche's	  idea	  of	  the	  break	  into	  history	  of	  the	  immediately	  arriving	  conquerors.	  	  	   V.	  Gordon	  Childe	  touches	  on	  the	  problem	  of	  speed	  of	  the	  imposition	  of	  the	  State.	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  Chapter	  7	  of	  Man	  Makes	  Himself	  (1936),	  after	  the	  description	  of	  the	  Neolithic	  Revolution,	  which	  brings	  together	  village	  sedentarization	  and	  agriculture,	  he	  writes	  of	  "Second	  Revolution"	  of	  urbanism,	  militarization,	  and	  statification:	  	  	   A	  second	  revolution	  transformed	  some	  tiny	  villages	  of	  self-­‐sufficing	  farmers	  into	  populous	  cities,	  nourished	  by	  secondary	  industries	  and	  foreign	  trade,	  and	  regularly	  organized	  as	  States.	  Some	  of	  the	  episodes	  which	  ushered	  in	  this	  transformation	  can	  be	  discerned,	  if	  dimly,	  by	  prehistory.	  The	  scene	  of	  the	  drama	  lies	  in	  the	  belt	  of	  semi-­‐arid	  countries	  between	  the	  Nile	  and	  the	  Ganges.	  Here	  epoch-­‐making	  inventions	  seem	  to	  have	  followed	  one	  another	  with	  breathless	  speed.	  (1936:	  105).	  	  We	  can	  at	  this	  point	  cautiously	  start	  to	  pull	  apart	  differing	  historical	  instantiations	  of	  the	  factors	  of	  the	  State	  complex	  of	  urbanism,	  militarism,	  and	  agriculture.	  In	  A	  Thousand	  
Plateaus,	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  [1987:	  428n;	  440]	  themselves	  cite	  Jane	  Jacob's	  [1970]	  speculations	  on	  Çatalhöyük	  on	  the	  precedence	  of	  trade-­‐based	  urbanism	  to	  agriculture,	  or	  better,	  the	  urban	  origins	  of	  agriculture.	  There	  is	  now	  the	  recent	  "Big	  Gods"	  hypothesis	  taking	  up	  the	  tangled	  question	  of	  military	  and	  religious	  power	  (Norenzayan	  2013).	  According	  to	  Norenzayan's	  reading	  of	  the	  very	  early	  Göbelki	  Tepe	  site,	  its	  temple	  construction	  required	  large-­‐scale	  cooperation	  yet	  is	  seemingly	  independent	  of	  centralized	  military	  power,	  hereditary	  /	  dynastic	  power	  transfer,	  coerced	  labor	  –	  all	  of	  which	  obtain	  in	  the	  classic	  imperial	  State	  (of	  whatever	  geographical	  size).	  	  	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  will	  end	  up	  with	  a	  topological	  approach	  in	  A	  Thousand	  Plateaus,	  avoiding	  the	  aporias	  of	  the	  auto-­‐presupposition	  of	  the	  origin	  of	  State	  from	  an	  evolutionist	  position.	  Sibertin-­‐Blanc	  shows	  how	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  replace	  Clastres's	  mysterious	  "presentiment"	  of	  the	  state	  by	  the	  primitives	  with	  an	  analysis,	  in	  the	  "Apparatus	  of	  Capture"	  chapter	  of	  ATP,	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  "anticipation	  /	  conjuration":	  the	  limit	  vs	  threshold	  distinction	  allows	  them	  to	  analyze	  always	  existing	  tendencies	  and	  the	  virtual	  thresholds	  that	  would	  require	  changing	  the	  assemblage.	  Thus	  statification	  for	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  relies	  on	  a	  multiplicity	  in	  which	  the	  differential	  processes	  (limit	  vs	  threshold)	  are	  control	  of	  land,	  labor,	  money.	  It's	  very	  important	  to	  note	  that	  once	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  make	  the	  shift	  to	  the	  topological	  analysis	  of	  socialization	  processes	  that	  statification	  is	  not	  once	  and	  for	  all.	  For	  them,	  as	  for	  Scott	  in	  The	  Art	  of	  Not	  Being	  Governed	  there	  are	  anti-­‐state	  and	  statification	  processes	  always	  happening.	  	  	   ECONOMIES	  OF	  VIOLENCE	  	  We	  can	  classify	  economies	  of	  violence	  using	  4	  main	  categories	  (intra-­‐	  and	  inter-­‐group	  and	  identified	  and	  anonymous	  violence).	  Each	  main	  category	  can	  be	  subdivided	  into	  non-­‐state	  and	  state	  societies,	  and	  further	  into	  individual	  acts	  and	  group	  response.	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  INTRA-­‐GROUP	  IDENTIFIED	  VIOLENCE:	  	  	  
Non-­‐state:	  individual	  acts:	  fights,	  murder.	  Group	  response	  of	  ostracism,	  exile,	  or	  "capital	  punishment."	  	  	  We	  have	  also	  to	  account	  for	  tolerated	  infanticide	  and	  geronticide	  in	  the	  economy	  of	  violence	  of	  forager	  bands;	  these	  don’t	  warrant	  group	  punishment	  (Hrdy	  2009).	  Infanticide	  and	  geronticide	  are	  aimed	  at	  maintaining	  mobility	  /	  nomadicism	  /	  anti-­‐sedentary,	  whereas	  ostracism,	  exile,	  and	  group	  retributive	  killing	  are	  aimed	  at	  maintaining	  equality	  /	  immanence	  /	  anti-­‐state.	  	  	   We	  can	  note	  in	  passing	  that	  Clastres	  and	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  focus	  on	  anti-­‐state	  mechanisms	  and	  don’t	  mention	  the	  classic	  feminist	  thesis	  that	  the	  Neolithic	  Revolution,	  bringing	  statification,	  urbanism,	  and	  agriculture	  also	  brings	  patriarchal	  concern	  with	  control	  of	  female	  sexuality	  /	  reproduction	  in	  service	  of	  population	  growth	  and	  hence	  shift	  to	  intolerance	  of	  infanticide.	  	  	  Now	  according	  to	  Christopher	  Boehm,	  Moral	  Origins	  (2012)	  the	  nomadic	  forager	  economy	  of	  violence	  has	  an	  anti-­‐state	  effect:	  it	  prevents	  centralized	  power	  of	  the	  big	  man.	  Boehm	  is	  an	  expert	  in	  ethnography	  of	  contemporary	  nomadic	  foragers.	  He	  cautions	  against	  the	  "living	  fossil"	  view,	  yet	  attempts	  cautious	  extrapolation	  to	  pre-­‐State	  social	  existence.	  	  
State:	  Individual	  acts	  of	  violence	  are	  coded	  as	  crime,	  calling	  forth	  group	  response	  of	  police	  and	  criminal	  justice.	  This	  is	  the	  drama	  of	  the	  Oresteia	  in	  which	  the	  state	  takes	  the	  "legitimate	  use	  of	  violence"	  away	  from	  families.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  call	  police	  and	  courts	  within	  a	  state	  "secondary	  violence,"	  in	  order	  to	  distinguish	  it	  from	  the	  primary	  violence	  of	  statification	  as	  the	  enslavement	  of	  non-­‐State	  peoples	  by	  imperial	  state	  conquest;	  secondary	  violence,	  that	  of	  the	  constituted	  juridical	  State,	  occludes	  primary	  violence,	  turning	  it	  "divine."	  	  INTRA-­‐GROUP	  ANONYMOUS	  VIOLENCE:	  	  	  
Non-­‐state:	  This	  is	  a	  void	  category	  for	  nomadic	  foragers;	  everyone	  knows	  everyone	  else	  in	  the	  group.	  	  
State	  society:	  Individual	  act:	  again	  this	  is	  crime,	  something	  like	  "mass	  murder"	  or	  "domestic	  terrorism."	  Group	  response:	  Official:	  police,	  justice	  system.	  Civil	  society:	  lynching,	  jail-­‐breaks	  	  INTER-­‐GROUP	  IDENTIFIED	  VIOLENCE:	  	  	  
Non-­‐state:	  Individual	  acts:	  personal	  fights,	  murder.	  Group	  response	  of	  permitted	  vengeance	  targeted	  to	  murderer.	  Sometimes	  the	  murderer	  is	  killed	  by	  his	  own	  kin	  and	  then	  the	  corpse	  presented	  to	  the	  victim's	  family;	  this	  is	  quite	  clearly	  an	  anti-­‐war	  gesture.	  Very	  important:	  According	  to	  Boehm,	  vengeance	  is	  an	  anti-­‐war	  process;	  it	  prevents	  escalation	  to	  anonymous	  inter-­‐group	  violence.	  So	  for	  Boehm,	  forager	  economies	  of	  violence	  are	  (intra-­‐group)	  anti-­‐State,	  and	  (inter-­‐group)	  anti-­‐war.	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State:	  once	  again,	  crime,	  with	  response	  either	  trial	  in	  situ	  or	  extradition.	  	  INTER-­‐GROUP	  ANONYMOUS	  VIOLENCE	  or	  WAR:	  Here	  we	  will	  be	  more	  fine-­‐grained,	  adding	  a	  category	  for	  chimpanzee	  inter-­‐group	  raiding,	  nomadic	  foragers,	  sedentary	  horticulturalists,	  and	  state	  societies.	  	  CHIMPANZEES	  engage	  in	  border	  raids,	  ambushing	  members	  of	  neighboring	  bands	  who	  are	  caught	  too	  close	  to	  the	  border.	  	  Does	  this	  deserve	  the	  name	  "war"?	  Would	  "raid"	  or	  "ambush"	  be	  better?	  	  Brian	  Ferguson	  (2014)	  proposes	  a	  Human	  Impact	  Thesis	  (basically	  territorial	  infringement)	  to	  account	  for	  contemporary	  evidence	  of	  chimpanzee	  inter-­‐group	  raids.	  	  What	  to	  do	  about	  the	  relatively	  peaceful	  bonobos?	  Frans	  DeWaal	  and	  Frans	  Lanting	  (1998)	  point	  out,	  against	  the	  thesis	  of	  the	  biological	  continuity	  of	  "war"	  from	  chimps	  to	  humans,	  that	  relatively	  peaceful	  bonobos	  are	  just	  as	  genetically	  related	  to	  us	  as	  chimps.	  Wrangham	  and	  Peterson,	  Demonic	  Males:	  Apes	  and	  the	  Origins	  of	  Human	  Violence	  (1996),	  however,	  point	  to	  female	  coalition-­‐building	  in	  bonobo	  society	  as	  preventing	  inter-­‐group	  violence	  by	  male-­‐coalitions.	  But	  I	  think	  the	  focus	  on	  eco-­‐social	  difference	  is	  not	  going	  to	  be	  male	  (chimps	  and	  men)	  vs	  female	  (bonobos)	  but	  1)	  egalitarian	  foragers	  (anti-­‐state	  and	  anti-­‐war)	  vs	  2)	  sedentary	  horticulturalists	  (anti-­‐state	  war)	  vs	  3)	  hierarchical	  agriculturalists	  (imperial	  statification	  via	  territorial	  and	  slave-­‐producing	  war).	  	  	  	  
Demonic	  Males	  equivocates	  between	  “war”	  and	  “violence”	  (war	  is	  a	  very	  specific	  form	  of	  violence)	  and	  conflates	  “war”	  and	  “border	  raid”	  —	  which	  they	  in	  turn	  assimilate	  too	  quickly	  to	  chimpanzee	  coalitionary	  killing	  (Kelly	  2005).	  (In	  particular,	  if	  you	  define	  war	  so	  as	  to	  include	  revenge	  raiding	  then	  you	  lose	  the	  Boehm	  thesis	  that	  vendetta	  is	  anti-­‐war.)	  They	  are	  right	  that	  we	  have	  to	  look	  to	  eco-­‐social	  multiplicity,	  but	  they	  overlook	  “techno”	  as	  one	  dimension	  (Kelly,	  PNAS	  on	  era	  of	  defensive	  advantage	  due	  to	  adoption	  of	  javelins).	  In	  sum,	  Demonic	  Males	  isn't	  sufficiently	  careful	  in	  examining	  forms	  of	  human	  social	  organization.	  Specifically,	  it	  doesn't	  investigate	  egalitarian	  forager	  anti-­‐war	  societies	  (whose	  anti-­‐war	  practices	  include	  violence	  AND	  peace)	  because	  for	  them	  all	  stories	  of	  anti-­‐war	  societies	  are	  myths,	  not	  ethnography.	  	  	  NOMADIC	  FORAGER	  BANDS.	  There	  is	  a	  vigorous	  debate	  as	  to	  whether	  nomadic	  forager	  bands	  engage	  in	  warfare	  (Keeley	  1997;	  Otterbein	  2004;	  Patou-­‐Mathis	  2013;	  Bowles	  and	  Gintis	  2011;	  Fry	  2007	  and	  2013a	  and	  2013b).	  We	  have	  dealt	  with	  complaints	  about	  the	  biological	  continuity	  thesis	  above.	  Here	  we	  can	  simply	  note	  that	  with	  regard	  to	  archeology	  that	  Brian	  Ferguson	  (2013a)	  questions	  the	  archeological	  evidence	  used	  by	  Pinker	  in	  Better	  
Angels	  (2011).	  There	  just	  aren't	  that	  many	  (or	  any)	  pre-­‐State	  multi-­‐body	  graves	  with	  violent	  marks	  on	  the	  skeletons.	  You	  need	  multi-­‐body	  sites	  because	  no	  one	  denies	  individual	  killing,	  either	  the	  murder,	  or	  the	  anti-­‐state	  "capital	  punishment"	  group	  response,	  or	  the	  anti-­‐war	  vendetta	  response	  in	  inter-­‐group	  violence.	  	  	   Napoleon	  Chagnon's	  study	  (1988),	  producing	  theses	  on	  war	  as	  evolved	  adaptation,	  is	  very	  controversial,	  with	  critics	  (Albert	  1989;	  Ferguson	  2001)	  and	  defenders.	  Criticisms:	  Social	  structure:	  the	  Yanomami	  are	  tribal	  /	  sedentary	  horticulturalist,	  thus	  generalizing	  to	  nomadic	  foragers	  is	  a	  questionable	  move	  (Fry	  2007).	  History:	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  Ferguson	  (1995)	  traces	  the	  centuries-­‐long	  history	  of	  relations	  between	  the	  Yanomami	  and	  the	  Brazilian	  state.	  Age:	  did	  Chagnon	  account	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  average	  age	  of	  his	  killers	  was	  @40	  and	  the	  non-­‐killers	  @20	  (Albert	  1989)?	  If	  not,	  then	  age	  would	  be	  a	  clear	  factor	  in	  reproductive	  success.	  Social	  status:	  did	  Chagnon	  account	  for	  "headman"	  status?	  Not	  all	  headman	  are	  killers,	  but	  they	  all	  do	  produce	  more	  children	  than	  average.	  Mortality:	  did	  Chagnon	  account	  for	  the	  total	  overall	  reproductive	  success	  of	  all	  who	  attempted	  warfare?	  If	  he	  didn't	  account	  for	  the	  low	  success	  of	  those	  killed	  early	  in	  their	  war	  career	  then	  he	  has	  biased	  his	  study	  in	  favor	  of	  those	  who	  survived.	  The	  term	  "unokai":	  this	  is	  a	  technical	  point	  having	  to	  do	  with	  how	  the	  term	  "killer"	  is	  earned.	  	  	  Ethnography	  (summarized	  in	  Boehm,	  Moral	  Origins	  [2012])	  of	  contemporary	  foragers	  shows	  multiple	  anti-­‐war	  mechanisms,	  including	  toleration	  of	  inter-­‐group	  vengeance.	  Raymond	  Kelly's	  social	  structure	  analysis	  (Warless	  Societies	  and	  the	  Origin	  of	  War	  [2000])	  claims	  that	  foragers	  lack	  the	  "logic	  of	  social	  substitution"	  enabling	  war	  qua	  anonymous	  group	  violence.	  (This	  would	  be	  consistent	  with	  Boehm	  and	  vengeance	  as	  personalizing	  and	  hence	  anti-­‐war.)	  	  In	  his	  2005	  PNAS	  article	  Raymond	  Kelly	  sketches	  a	  geo-­‐eco-­‐techno-­‐social	  multiplicity	  that	  results	  in	  a	  period	  of	  "intrinsic	  defensive	  advantage."	  Geo:	  defenders	  know	  their	  territory	  and	  can	  hold	  ambush	  positions.	  Eco:	  low	  population	  density	  meant	  defenders	  can	  flee	  if	  needed.	  Techno:	  throwing	  spears	  allow	  inflicting	  damage	  on	  invaders	  w/	  low	  risk	  to	  defenders.	  Social:	  invading	  parties	  would	  be	  non-­‐specialists;	  defenders	  would	  have	  throwing	  skills	  developed	  in	  hunting.	  	  Kelly	  concludes	  by	  mentioning	  development	  of	  positive	  peace-­‐seeking	  inter-­‐group	  mechanisms	  (diplomacy,	  feasts,	  contests).	  For	  Kelly,	  it's	  a	  shift	  to	  state	  military	  specialization	  that	  allows	  strikes	  at	  the	  home	  camp	  that	  shifts	  the	  balance	  and	  allows	  state	  territorial	  acquisition	  and	  enslavement	  warfare.	  	  My	  take-­‐away	  point	  for	  the	  work	  on	  the	  economy	  of	  violence	  of	  pre-­‐State	  nomadic	  forager	  bands:	  with	  a	  universal	  war	  anthropological	  perspective,	  you	  assume	  hostility	  is	  the	  default	  setting	  for	  inter-­‐group	  relations,	  and	  war	  is	  women-­‐capture	  (acquisition	  of	  reproductive	  resources:	  here	  is	  economization	  of	  evolution).	  But	  this	  is	  not	  a	  rigorous	  historical	  materialism;	  peace-­‐seeking	  mechanisms	  are	  just	  as	  materialist	  as	  war.	  In	  fact,	  they	  allow	  more	  efficient	  resource	  exploitation:	  the	  two	  sides	  are	  not	  afraid	  to	  exploit	  to	  the	  border	  of	  their	  territories,	  as	  they	  would	  be	  if	  border	  raids	  were	  frequent.	  	  	  SEDENTARY	  HORTICULTURALISTS	  are	  non-­‐state,	  but	  they	  do	  practice	  war.	  In	  fact,	  Clastres	  thought	  war	  was	  an	  anti-­‐state	  process.	  Despite	  war	  command,	  chiefs	  have	  no	  civil	  authority,	  no	  power	  to	  command.	  Chiefs	  would	  have	  to	  continually	  prove	  their	  valor	  in	  war	  but	  precisely	  the	  high	  mortality	  rate	  would	  prevent	  their	  consolidation	  of	  power	  enabling	  command	  relations	  rather	  than	  persuasion,	  and	  preventing	  nepotism.	  The	  political	  positivity	  of	  non-­‐State	  societies	  for	  Clastres	  consists	  in	  having	  the	  locus	  of	  political	  power	  be	  the	  tribe	  itself	  (1989:	  207)	  such	  that	  it	  exercised	  "absolute	  and	  complete	  power	  over	  all	  the	  elements	  of	  which	  it	  is	  composed"	  (1989:	  212).	  	  	   There	  is	  a	  notion	  of	  "ritual	  warfare"	  (discussed	  in	  order	  to	  be	  dismissed	  in	  Otterbein	  2004)	  we	  would	  have	  to	  confront	  here	  in	  a	  more	  full	  discussion.	  Agreed-­‐upon	  battles	  that	  are	  actually	  loose	  collections	  of	  individual	  insults	  and	  weapon-­‐launching,	  often	  ending	  with	  the	  first	  casualty.	  Some	  have	  even	  talked	  about	  the	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  ritual	  aspect	  of	  many	  Greek	  inter-­‐polis	  battles,	  which	  never	  resulted	  in	  territorial	  conquest	  and	  enslavement	  –	  the	  Spartan	  conquest	  of	  the	  helots	  being	  the	  exception	  proving	  the	  rule.	  	  	  So	  for	  Clastres	  the	  chief	  serves	  the	  tribe	  and	  his	  function	  is	  to	  resolve	  conflicts	  via	  oratory.	  Remember	  that	  an	  economy	  of	  violence	  includes	  practices	  that	  avoid	  violence.	  So	  the	  chief	  has	  to	  persuade	  people	  in	  conflict	  to	  calm	  down,	  and	  to	  emulate	  harmonious	  ancestors.	  	  	  By	  the	  way,	  Clastres	  provides	  here	  an	  implicit	  critique	  of	  Nietzsche's	  "morality	  of	  custom"	  as	  laid	  out	  in	  Essay	  2	  of	  the	  Genealogy.	  Non-­‐state	  societies	  aren't	  unthinkingly	  devoted	  to	  dead	  repetition	  of	  customary	  practices.	  Custom	  must	  always	  be	  interpreted	  and	  applied	  to	  current	  circumstances.	  The	  eloquent	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  chief	  in	  guiding	  dispute-­‐resolution	  will	  appeal	  to	  the	  examples	  of	  the	  virtuous	  ancestors.	  But	  there's	  nothing	  mechanical	  here:	  chiefs	  can	  be	  more	  or	  less	  eloquent	  and	  persuasive	  in	  their	  appeals	  to	  "the	  way	  we've	  always	  done	  things."	  	  STATE	  SOCIETIES	  practice	  territorial	  warfare	  using	  military	  organization	  and	  disciplinary	  training	  to	  enable	  killing	  behavior	  (Protevi	  2009	  and	  2013;	  on	  the	  difficulty	  of	  enabling	  that	  killing	  behavior,	  see	  Grossman	  1996	  and	  Collins	  2008).	  	  	  Sibertin-­‐Blanc	  reminds	  us	  that	  there’s	  always	  an	  undecidability	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  Ur-­‐staat	  as	  theory	  of	  State	  form:	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari’s	  work	  is	  both	  materialist	  history	  of	  an	  apparatus	  of	  power	  (rewriting	  of,	  e.g.,	  Engels,	  Origin	  of	  the	  Family	  …)	  and	  analysis	  of	  historical	  desire	  /	  collective	  subjectivation	  /	  group	  fantasy	  (rewriting	  of,	  e.g.,	  Freud,	  Totem	  and	  Taboo)	  (Sibertin-­‐Blanc	  2013:	  16)?	  	  	  That	  is,	  from	  the	  Deleuzo-­‐Guattarian	  perspective	  at	  the	  time	  of	  Anti-­‐Oedipus,	  the	  problem	  of	  statification	  is	  how	  to	  reorient	  desiring	  production	  from	  primitive	  immanent	  horizontalism	  (saturation	  of	  social	  field	  by	  always	  unequal	  obligations	  or	  “mobile	  blocs	  of	  debt”)	  to	  barbarian	  transcendent	  hierarchical	  center	  (infinite	  debt	  owed	  to	  emperor	  –	  this	  is	  a	  "real"	  debt,	  quantitatively	  measured	  and	  hence	  qualitatively	  different	  from	  non-­‐quantitative	  obliged).	  This	  is	  the	  problem	  of	  desire	  Clastres	  never	  solved:	  he	  could	  show	  primitive	  machine	  wards	  off	  the	  State	  by	  production	  of	  desire	  for	  war-­‐prestige	  in	  the	  chiefs,	  as	  well	  as	  desire	  for	  equality	  and	  free	  time	  by	  everyone,	  but	  could	  never	  show	  how	  it	  became	  desire	  for	  the	  State.	  That	  was	  always	  a	  mystery	  to	  him,	  and	  is	  why	  he	  was	  fascinated	  by	  Étienne	  de	  la	  Boétie,	  Discourse	  on	  Voluntary	  Servitude	  (2012),	  especially	  its	  subtitle:	  "Against	  the	  One,"	  which	  he	  took	  to	  be	  an	  instance	  of	  "political	  metaphysics"	  (Clastres	  1994:	  93-­‐104).	  	  	   THE	  SPINOZA	  QUESTION	  	  In	  The	  Evolved	  Apprentice	  (2012)	  Kim	  Sterelny	  claims	  there	  has	  been	  an	  over-­‐estimation	  of	  difficulty	  of	  cheater	  detection	  in	  small	  groups.	  (Hence	  he	  is	  not	  a	  supporter	  of	  Machiavellian	  Intelligence	  theories	  alone;	  in	  fact,	  cheater	  detection	  is	  less	  demanding	  than	  coordinating	  cooperation	  [2012,	  7-­‐10].)	  The	  real	  issue	  is	  how	  does	  cooperation	  in	  complex	  tasks	  work?	  His	  answer,	  apprenticeship,	  is	  fascinating	  in	  its	  own	  right,	  but	  what	  I	  want	  to	  concentrate	  on	  here	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  at	  the	  end	  of	  his	  book	  Sterelny	  poses	  the	  question	  of	  functionalism,	  or	  if	  you	  prefer,	  the	  Spinoza	  question:	  why	  do	  people	  go	  along	  with	  hierarchies	  when	  they	  are	  at	  the	  bottom	  –	  or	  at	  least	  not	  at	  the	  top?	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  Granted,	  then,	  that	  the	  supreme	  mystery	  of	  despotism,	  its	  prop	  and	  stay,	  is	  to	  keep	  men	  in	  a	  state	  of	  deception,	  and	  with	  the	  specious	  title	  of	  religion	  to	  cloak	  the	  fear	  by	  which	  they	  must	  be	  held	  in	  check,	  so	  that	  they	  will	  fight	  for	  their	  servitude	  as	  if	  for	  their	  salvation,	  and	  count	  it	  no	  shame,	  but	  the	  highest	  honour,	  to	  spend	  their	  blood	  and	  their	  lives	  for	  the	  glorification	  of	  one	  man.	  (Spinoza	  2002,	  389-­‐90	  [TTP,	  Preface])	  Let	  me	  return	  to	  the	  Big	  Gods	  thesis	  of	  Norenzayan	  (2012).	  How	  can	  the	  State	  (top-­‐down,	  centralized	  violence	  forcing	  agricultural	  labor)	  instill	  prosocial	  behavior	  in	  transition	  from	  nomadic	  foragers?	  There	  can't	  simply	  be	  only	  external	  monitoring	  and	  terrorizing	  punishment,	  as	  there	  are	  limits	  to	  capillary	  power.	  That	  is,	  local	  officials,	  if	  they	  are	  far	  enough	  away	  from	  the	  imperial	  capital,	  are	  prone	  to	  "corruption"	  aka	  self-­‐aggrandizement,	  but	  that	  very	  distance	  means	  they	  may	  also	  then	  be	  weak	  enough	  to	  be	  overthrown	  and	  /	  or	  be	  helpless	  to	  prevent	  flight	  (again,	  Scott	  is	  key	  here).	  Here	  we	  see	  a	  geo-­‐techno-­‐social	  multiplicity:	  imperial	  "force	  projection"	  to	  reinforce	  tribute	  /	  terrorize	  holdouts	  depends	  on	  terrain	  /	  mode	  of	  transport	  /	  reliability	  of	  information	  /	  discipline	  of	  local	  authorities	  and	  soldiers.	  	  There	  has	  to	  be	  a	  way	  of	  inducing	  internal	  motivation	  for	  following	  the	  new	  patterns	  of	  social	  flows	  and	  breaks,	  that	  is,	  in	  the	  terms	  of	  Anti-­‐Oedipus,	  the	  new	  desiring	  production	  that	  is	  now	  coded	  in	  terms	  of	  sending	  surplus	  to	  the	  social	  machine	  focused	  on	  the	  transcendent	  figure	  of	  the	  Emperor	  rather	  than	  web	  of	  obligations	  saturating	  an	  immanent	  social	  field	  with	  excess	  quickly	  consumed	  in	  feasting.	  To	  meet	  this	  need,	  Norenzayan	  posits	  "Big	  Gods,"	  that	  is,	  the	  Eye	  in	  the	  Sky.	  Forager	  societies	  have	  collective	  monitoring:	  they	  are	  so	  small	  everyone	  knows	  who	  is	  a	  good	  hunter	  /	  gatherer	  /	  child-­‐care-­‐provider	  /	  peace-­‐maker	  /	  defender.	  This	  small-­‐scale	  social	  monitoring	  needs	  to	  be	  replaced	  or	  at	  least	  supplemented.	  	  	   Huebner	  and	  Sarkissian	  (forthcoming)	  summarize	  Norenzayan:	  1)	  outsourcing	  social	  monitoring	  to	  moralizing	  Big	  Gods;	  2)	  developing	  rituals	  to	  build	  and	  signal	  commitment;	  and	  3)	  creating	  practices	  to	  exploit	  in-­‐group	  favoritism	  and	  tribal	  psychology.	  	  The	  transition	  to	  Big	  Govs	  allows	  central	  power	  to	  handle	  the	  secularization	  transition.	  In	  addition,	  Huebner	  and	  Sarkissian	  point	  to	  three	  other	  forms	  of	  "mutual	  accountability,"	  so	  we	  need	  to	  widen	  "hypothesis	  space"	  of	  forms	  of	  social	  power	  that	  allow	  large-­‐scale	  anonymous	  societies.	  	  My	  takeaway	  is	  that	  the	  inducement	  of	  patterns	  of	  motivation	  is	  an	  ongoing	  field	  of	  socialization	  practices:	  it's	  never	  a	  clean	  break	  between	  collectivity	  and	  atomization;	  it's	  a	  "molecular"	  field	  of	  constant	  interaction.	  	  	  Sterelny	  points	  to	  Richerson	  and	  Boyd	  2005:	  how	  do	  small	  group	  cooperation	  and	  emotional	  commitment	  allow	  hierarchies	  to	  function?	  (There	  is	  a	  lot	  here	  about	  the	  proximal	  motivations	  of	  soldiers:	  the	  "band	  of	  brothers"	  phenomenon.)	  Richerson	  and	  Boyd	  distinguish	  what	  they	  call	  the	  family	  emotions	  (nepotism)	  from	  the	  tribal	  emotions	  (groups	  or	  prosocial).	  So	  how	  do	  hierarchies	  work	  with	  people	  with	  group	  or	  "tribal"	  prosocial	  emotions?	  	  	   Top-­‐down	  control	  is	  generally	  exerted	  through	  a	  segmentary	  hierarchy	  that	  is	  adapted	  to	  preserve	  nearly	  egalitarian	  relationships	  at	  the	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  level…The	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  trick	  is	  to	  construct	  a	  formal	  nested	  hierarchy	  of	  offices,	  using	  various	  mixtures	  of	  ascription	  and	  achievement	  to	  staff	  the	  offices….	  Selfishness	  and	  nepotism	  [family	  emotions]	  …	  degrade	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  social	  organizations.	  (Richerson	  and	  Boyd	  2005:	  232-­‐33)	  	  But	  I	  think	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  in	  their	  Anti-­‐Oedipus	  moment,	  would	  say	  that	  Richerson	  and	  Boyd	  don't	  give	  fascist	  –	  or	  even	  just	  plain	  old	  authoritarian	  emotional	  commitment	  –	  enough	  credit	  here.	  People	  will	  also	  directly	  emotionally	  invest	  in	  hierarchies	  as	  such	  (vertically,	  if	  you	  will),	  not	  just	  horizontally	  to	  peer	  groups.	  	   These	  investments	  of	  an	  unconscious	  nature	  can	  ensure	  the	  general	  submission	  to	  a	  dominant	  class	  by	  making	  cuts	  (coupures)	  and	  segregations	  pass	  over	  into	  a	  social	  field,	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  effectively	  invested	  by	  desire	  and	  no	  longer	  by	  interests.	  A	  form	  of	  social	  production	  and	  reproduction,	  along	  with	  its	  economic	  and	  financial	  mechanisms,	  its	  political	  formations,	  and	  so	  on,	  can	  be	  desired	  as	  such,	  in	  whole	  or	  in	  part,	  independently	  of	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  desiring-­‐subject.	  It	  was	  not	  by	  means	  of	  a	  metaphor,	  even	  a	  paternal	  metaphor,	  that	  Hitler	  was	  able	  to	  sexually	  arouse	  the	  fascists.	  It	  is	  not	  by	  means	  of	  a	  metaphor	  that	  a	  banking	  or	  stock-­‐market	  transaction,	  a	  claim,	  a	  coupon,	  a	  credit,	  is	  able	  to	  arouse	  people	  who	  are	  not	  necessarily	  bankers.	  And	  what	  about	  the	  effects	  of	  money	  that	  grows,	  money	  that	  produces	  more	  money?	  There	  are	  socioeconomic	  "complexes"	  that	  are	  also	  veritable	  complexes	  of	  the	  unconscious,	  and	  that	  communicate	  a	  voluptuous	  wave	  from	  the	  top	  to	  the	  bottom	  of	  their	  hierarchy	  (the	  military-­‐industrial	  complex).	  And	  ideology,	  Oedipus,	  and	  the	  phallus	  have	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  this,	  because	  they	  depend	  on	  it	  rather	  than	  being	  its	  impetus.	  For	  it	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  flows,	  of	  stocks,	  of	  breaks	  in	  and	  fluctuations	  of	  flows;	  desire	  is	  present	  wherever	  something	  flows	  and	  runs,	  carrying	  along	  with	  it	  interested	  subjects—but	  also	  drunken	  or	  slumbering	  subjects—toward	  lethal	  destinations.	  (Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  1977,	  103-­‐104).	  	  	   CONCLUSION:	  HUMAN	  NATURE	  	  Throughout	  my	  work,	  I	  address	  human	  nature	  as	  bio-­‐cultural.	  Each	  one	  of	  us	  is	  a	  “body	  politic”	  that	  connects	  the	  social	  and	  the	  somatic.	  I	  avoid	  the	  extremes	  of	  social	  constructivism	  and	  genetic	  determinism	  by	  claiming	  we	  inherit	  a	  disposition	  to	  prosociality	  as	  a	  minimal	  human	  nature	  that	  gets	  fine-­‐tuned	  by	  culture.	  In	  a	  formula,	  our	  human	  nature	  has	  evolved	  to	  be	  so	  open	  to	  our	  nurture	  that	  it	  becomes	  second	  nature.	  	  	  Cross-­‐culturally	  convergent	  child-­‐rearing	  practices	  allow	  prosociality	  as	  emotional	  investment	  in	  social	  patterns	  produced	  and	  reinforced	  by	  complex	  cooperative	  altruism.	  Thus	  the	  Spinoza	  question	  will	  have	  to	  address	  child	  development	  psychology.	  	  Theories	  of	  human	  nature	  are	  a	  political	  battleground,	  and	  we	  cannot	  be	  intimidated	  by	  the	  cheap	  cynicism	  and	  blustering	  scientism	  of	  the	  right.	  For	  too	  long,	  the	  left	  adopted	  social	  constructivism	  to	  fight	  racist	  and	  sexist	  constructions	  of	  human	  nature.	  But	  in	  the	  meantime	  the	  neoliberal	  right	  has	  distanced	  itself	  from	  old-­‐fashioned	  racism	  and	  sexism	  to	  put	  forth	  a	  version	  of	  human	  nature	  as	  the	  individualist,	  competitive,	  utility	  maximizing	  rational	  agent,	  an	  agent	  they	  claim	  is	  the	  result	  of	  natural	  selection	  in	  ultra-­‐Darwinian	  competition.	  But	  their	  monopoly	  on	  biological	  discourse	  is	  overthrown	  by	  new	  research;	  we	  have	  to	  have	  the	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  courage	  to	  claim	  that	  current	  evolutionary	  biology	  and	  developmental	  psychology	  shows	  that	  human	  nature	  is	  prosocial	  in	  its	  default	  setting.	  	   In	  fact,	  you	  need	  to	  turn	  things	  around.	  Elinor	  Ostrom	  (2005)	  has	  a	  fine	  article	  on	  "Policies	  that	  Crowd	  Out	  Reciprocity	  and	  Collective	  Action,"	  in	  which	  she	  shows	  that	  models	  that	  presuppose	  a	  population	  of	  rational	  egoists	  fail	  to	  account	  for	  "strong	  reciprocators"	  (those	  willing	  to	  undergo	  costs	  to	  punish	  non-­‐conformity	  involving	  third	  parties).	  But	  you	  can	  produce	  rational	  egoists	  if	  you	  design	  policies	  assuming	  need	  for	  external	  motivation.	  So	  it's	  not	  really	  that	  you	  have	  to	  socialize	  individuals;	  what	  you	  need	  to	  do	  is	  have	  policies	  that	  atomize	  the	  prosocially	  oriented.	  	  	  	  Similarly,	  in	  their	  overreaching	  claim	  to	  be	  the	  inheritors	  of	  the	  classical	  liberals,	  neoliberals	  open	  the	  door	  to	  rehabilitating	  the	  theory	  of	  moral	  sentiments	  proposed	  by	  Adam	  Smith	  and	  David	  Hume.	  The	  political	  challenge	  of	  the	  new	  view	  of	  human	  nature	  is	  to	  extend	  the	  reach	  of	  prosocial	  impulses	  beyond	  the	  in-­‐group,	  protect	  them	  from	  the	  negative	  emotions,	  and	  build	  on	  them	  to	  genuine	  altruism.	  (Thanks	  to	  Len	  Lawlor	  and	  others,	  I	  am	  aware	  that	  this	  expansion	  is	  what	  Bergson	  denies	  is	  possible	  in	  the	  Two	  Sources.)	  	  All	  this	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  the	  selfish	  nature	  of	  the	  basic	  emotions	  of	  rage	  and	  fear	  (Panksepp	  1998).	  The	  key	  to	  a	  fruitful	  left	  approach	  to	  human	  nature	  is	  studying	  how	  such	  selfish,	  negative	  emotions	  are	  manipulated,	  or,	  more	  positively,	  how	  a	  social	  order	  can	  be	  constructed	  to	  minimize	  them	  and	  to	  maximize	  positive	  affects.	  I	  hope	  I	  can	  contribute	  to	  that	  project.	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